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THE GREYING OF AMERICAN TRADEMARKS: THE
GENUINE GOODS EXCLUSION ACT AND THE
INCONGRUITY OF CUSTOMS
REGULATION 19 C.F.R. § 133.21
INTRODUCTION

Under section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930,1 if a registered United
States trademark owned by an American citizen, corporation or associa-

tion is recorded with the U.S. Customs Service (Customs), importing foreign produced goods bearing that trademark without the U.S. trademark
owner's written consent is unlawful.2 Despite the statute's clarity and
precise wording, the Customs regulations issued to implement the statute

deny protection to companies incorporated in the U.S. related to the foreign manufacturer of the trademarked goods. Protection is also denied if
the goods are trademarked abroad with the consent of the U.S. owner.'

This administrative interpretation of section 526 has resulted in a flood
1. 42 Stat. 975 (1922) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982)).
2. [I]t shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of
foreign manufacture if such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package,
wrapper, or receptacle, bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized within, the United States, and registered in the Patent and Trademark Office by a person domiciled in the United
States, under the provisions of sections 81 to 109 of Title 15, and if a copy of the
certificate of registration of such trademark is filed with the Secretary of the
Treasury, in the manner provided in section 106 of said Title 15, unless written
consent of the owner of such trademark is produced at the time of making
entry.
19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982).
3. 19 C.F.RL §§ 133.21(a), (b), (c)(1)-(3) (1985):
Restrictions on importation of articles bearing recorded trademarks and
trade names.
(a) Copying or simulating marks or names. Articles of foreign or domestic
manufacture bearing a mark or name copying or simulating a recorded trademark or trade name shall be denied entry and are subject to forfeiture as prohibited importations. A "copying or simulating" mark or name is an actual
counterfeit of the recorded mark or name or is one which so resembles it as to
be likely to cause the public to associate the copying or simulating mark with
the recorded mark or name.
(b) Identicaltrademark. Foreign-made articles bearing a trademark identical
with one owned and recorded by a citizen of the United States or a corporation
or association created or organized within the United States are subject to
seizure and forfeiture as prohibited importations.
(c) Restrictionsnot applicable. The restrictions set forth in paragraphs (a) and
(b) of this section do not apply to imported articles when:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned by the
same person or business entity;
(2) The foreign and the domestic trademark or trade name owners are patent
and subsidiary companies or otherwise subject to common ownership or control
(see §§ 133.2(d) and 133.12(d));
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or trade
name applied under authorization of the U.S. owner.
Id
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in the American market
of unauthorized imports, commonly known as
"grey market goods."' 4 These grey market goods threaten the goodwilldeveloped by the domestic trademark owner by causing consumer confusion 6 and loss of trade outside authorized distribution channels. 7
4. See S. Liebeler, Gray-Market Imports, Outline of Speech Before the Second Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of International Trade, Oct. 23, 1985
(Vice-Chairman, U.S. International Trade Commission) (available in the files of Fordham
Law Review); cf. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420, 423 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984) (grey marketing "is a widespread practice"), affid, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
petition for cert.filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411).
Grey market goods have been defined as merchandise produced and sold legitimately
abroad under a particular trademark imported into the U.S. market without the consent
of the U.S. trademark owner and sold in competition with the U.S. trademark owner's
goods. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985), petition
for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411). "A gray market is
created when an arbitrageur takes advantage of a price difference between two markets by
buying in the market where prices are lower and selling in the market where prices are
higher." W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik v. Action Indus., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 763, 764 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). These goods are "genuine" in that they bear a genuine as opposed to a
counterfeit trademark. Where the U.S. trademark owner is an importer of the goods as
well, the grey market goods are also known as parallel imports. Vivitar Corp., 761 F.2d at
1555.
5. "Good will may be defined as the favorable consideration shown by the purchasing public to goods known to emanate from a particular source." White Tower Sys. v.
White Castle Sys. of Eating Houses Corp., 90 F.2d 67, 69 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S.
720 (1937).
"Good will" ..
is "that which makes tomorrow's business more than an accident." Another definition holds that the basis of [trademark] protection consists of an effort to safeguard a person trading under a certain mark or name
against any attempted "interference with his reasonable expectation of future
patronage."
W. Derenberg, Trade-mark Protection and Unfair Trading 49-50 (1936) (footnotes omitted). Judge Cardozo defined goodwill as "a reasonable expectancy of preference in the
race of competition. . . .Such expectancy may come from succession in place or name
or otherwise to a business that has won the favor of its customers." In re of Brown, 242
N.Y. 1, 6, 150 N.E. 581, 582 (1926). The House of Lords refers to goodwill as "the word
to include whatever adds value to a business by reason of situation, name and reputation,
connection, introduction to old customers, and an agreed absence from competition ...
[G]oodwill is inseparable from the business to which it [sic] adds value." Commissioners
of Inland Revenue v. Muller & Co.'s Margarine, Ltd., [1901] A.C. 217, 235; see Note,
Preventing the Importationand Sale of Genuine Goods Bearing American-Owned Trademarks. ProtectingAn American Goodwill, 35 Me. L. Rev. 315, 320 n.35 (1983) (goodwill
is both a purchasing tool for the consuming public and a business asset for the trademark
owner) [hereinafter cited as PreventingImportation].
Regardless of the perspective from which it is viewed, "[g]ood-will is property," 1 H.
Nims, The Law of Unfair Competition and Trademarks § 13, at 78 (4th ed. 1947), "in a
very real sense," Old Dearborn Co. v. Seagram Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 194 (1936). Moreover, "[t]he good-will represented by a name or trade-mark may be more important and
more valuable than any other part or property of the business." I H. Nims, supra, § 15,
at 81. "This basic premise that unfair competition laws should protect the benefits of
goodwill is embedded in the trademark laws." In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, No. 337TA-165, U.S.I.T.C. pub. 1616, at 17 (Int'l Trade Comm. 1984). Indeed, the goodwill
associated with a trademark must be included when a trademark owner assigns its registered trademark to another party. 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1982).
6. Purchasers of grey market products who are unaware of the products' unauthorized status become confused when seeking either warranty protection or a promotional
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The U.S. trademark owner also loses sales' to retailers of grey market
rebate. Often consumers are affirmatively deceived by retailers that a grey market product is warranted by the U.S. trademark owner. Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F.
Supp. 1163, 1168-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see Seiko Time Corp. v. Alexander's, Inc., 218
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 560, 564-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Grey market products, because they are
imported and sold without the U.S. trademark owner's authorization, are not warranted
by the U.S. trademark owner. This forces U.S. trademark owners into a dilemma they
must either increase their costs by warranting both authorized imports and grey market
products or turn these purchasers away, thereby injuring the goodwill of the trademark.
Collado Associates, The Economic Impact of Diversion 26-27 (Sept. 1984) (unpublished
manuscript) (available in the files of Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Collado
Associates]. Thus, diverters, in addition to operating at lower cost because they do not
warrant their products, significantly increase the cost of the U.S. trademark owner's operation. Osawa & Co., 589 F. Supp. at 1167-68. Further, because the manufacturer intended these products to be sold in countries other than the United States, they are
packaged with instruction manuals written in foreign languages. American purchasers of
grey market goods become confused and dissatisfied because they are unable to operate
the product without an English language instruction manual. Id. at 1169.
Consumer confusion also results when grey market goods are discontinued products,
do not meet U.S. health and safety standards, or when they are accompanied by inadequate or deceptive warranties and inferior service. Collado Associates, supra, at 50. A
problem peculiar to precision instruments such as watches exists because of the effect of
19 C.F.R. § 11.9 (1985). Pursuant to the regulation, no watch can be imported into the
United States unless it is marked with the requisite information concerning its source on
the back. of its case and on its movement. Watches made for U.S. consumption are
marked by the manufacturer in sterile environments. Grey market watches must therefore be opened and marked by the diverter before they can be imported. Negligent handling by the diverter may impair the performance of the watch resulting in both
consumer confusion and derogation of goodwill. See Seiko Time Corp., 218 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 565-66.
7. Generally, U.S. trademark owners selling foreign-produced goods have a network
of authorized dealers to whom they sell for resale to the public See, eg., Vivitar Corp. v.
United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1985), petition for cert.filed, 54 U.S.L.W.
3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411); Parfurns Stem, Inc. v. United States Customs
Serv., 575 F. Supp. 416, 418 (S.D. Fla. 1983). These authorized dealers are responsible
for the promotion, support and service of the product necessary to maintain the trademark's goodwill. See Coaliation to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United
States, 598 F. Supp. 844, 850 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal docketed, No. 84-5890 (D.C. Cir.
Dec. 28, 1984) [hereinafter cited as COPIA 7. Authorized dealers are frequently trained
at the expense of the U.S. trademark owner to educate potential customers about the
benefits of their products, see Collado Associates, supra note 6, at 17-20, and are often
required to have adequate inventory to meet the continued needs of their customers, see
id. at 21-27.
Unauthorized dealers are often uneducated about the product line, Id. at 16-20, and
compete with the U.S. trademark owner's authorized distributors by selling through discount outlets that do not carry the manufacturer's full line of products. Id. at 21-27; see
Vivitar Corp., 761 F.2d at 1556. U.S. trademark owners complain that sales outside the
authorized distribution chain result in lost prestige, which impairs the trademark's goodwill and diffuses the U.S. trademark owner's promotional efforts. See COPL4T, 598 F.
Supp. at 850. Moreover, they assert that the grey market goods are of a different quality.
See id. See generally Collado Associates, supra note 6 (reviewing the problems of products marketed with different quality). Indeed, some courts have found this to be the case.
See, eg., Model Rectifier Corp. v. Takachiho Intl Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 502, 503
(9th Cir. 1983); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1167-68 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
8. Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Collado
Associates, supra note 6, at 34-52. While some commentators dismiss lost sales to
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goods who are able to "free ride" 9 on the goodwill and market developed

by the U.S. trademark owner. In response, U.S. trademark owners have
challenged the Customs regulations, urging that the plain meaning of
diverters as a necessary and positive function of a competitive market, see, eg., Note,
Trade-MarkInfringement. The Power of an American Trade-Mark Owner to Prevent the
Importation of the Authentic ProductManufactured by a Foreign Company, 64 Yale L.J.
557, 563-64 & n.39 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Power of Trade-Mark Owner]; see also
Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Customs Serv., 575 F. Supp. 416, 421 (S.D. Fla.
1983) ("the public has the benefit of lower prices in that those products offered by (the
diverters] are usually less expensive than those sold by [the U.S. trademark owner]
through its authorized distributors"), there can be no doubt that one of the interests
sought to be protected by the registration of a trademark is the U.S. trademark owner's
investment of energy, time and money in developing the goodwill and public recognition
of its trademark. See S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946) (Providing for the
Registration and Protection of Trade-Marks used in Commerce to Carry Out the Provisions of Certain International Conventions); PreventingImportation,supra note 5, at 316
n.9. The U.S. trademark owner has a vested right in the expectation of future trade. See
Industrial Rayon Corp. v. Dutchess Underwear Corp., 92 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1937)
("The owner of the mark acquires the right to prevent the goods to which the mark is
applied from being confused with those of others and to prevent his own trade from being
diverted to competitors. . . ."), cert denied, 303 U.S. 640 (1938); cf Callmann, Unfair
Competition without Competition? The Importance of the PropertyConcept in the Law of
Trademarks, 95 U. Pa. L. Rev. 443, 459 (1947) (trademark rights include the right to
"exclude others from any use or from disturbing the owner's use thereof"); Schechter,
The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 823 (1927) (trademark owners should be allowed to use their mark for the "natural expansion" of trade).
This right to a return on a substantial investment is no less protectable merely because
the U.S. trademark owner is related to its foreign manufacturer. Cf. Bell & Howell:
Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063, 1076 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated
on other grounds, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983). The size of the investment is self-evident
from the immediate recognition of many trademarks: VIVITAR, DURACELL, MERCEDES-BENZ, SEIKO, OSCAR de la RENTA, OLYMPUS. See Industrial Rayon
Corp. v. Dutchess Underwear Corp., 92 F.2d 33, 34 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S.
640 (1938).
9. Free riding is most prevalent in markets where the consumer makes a purchase
"only after extensive demonstration and advice from the dealer," P. Areeda, Antitrust
Analysis 503, at 647 (3d ed. 1981), and can be best explained by way of an example. A
consumer seeking to purchase a product "may seek advice in a full-service [authorized
dealer] and buy in a 'discount' house that provides no such services. The discount house
is said to take a 'free ride' on the services provided by others.. . .This problem may
arise wherever advertising, other pre-sale effort, or post-sale maintenance. . . is important to the sale of a product." Id.; see Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court:
An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, HorizontalMerger and Potential Competition
Decisions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 282, 285 (1975).
Because of the strength and recognition of the American trademark, diverters'free ride
on the brand advertising and promotion of the U.S. trademark owner. Retailers of grey
market goods therefore need only spend money to advertise price. "[Grey marketers]
have no incentive to support the goodwill of any mark they sell; their sales are based
solely on price advantage." Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1167
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); see Collado Associates, supra note 6, at 12-16. Diverters also free ride
on the U.S. trademark owner's inventories and service networks. Id. at 21-27. "It cannot
be denied that a third party who purchases merchandise abroad, then imports it and sells
in competition with the American trademark registrant, gets the benefit of free advertising in the American market." Atwood, Import Restrictions on TrademarkedMerchandise-The Role of the United States Bureau of Customs, 59 Trade-Mark Rep. 301, 308
(1969).
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section 526 be given effect."°
The Customs Service argues that the regulations thwart price discrimi12
nation" against American consumers and prevent antitrust violations.
Customs maintains that the legislative history of section 52613 supports
its position and that courts should defer 14 to its "longstanding and consistent"'" interpretation of the Act. Courts confronted with the grey
market controversy have reached inconsistent results.16
Part I of this Note examines section 526 by exploring its legislative
history and administrative and judicial interpretations, and argues that
the plain meaning of section 526 should be given effect. Part II examines
the antitrust and trademark implications of the statute as written and the
10. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985), petitionfor
cert filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411); Olympus Corp. v.
United States, No. CV-84-0920, slip op. at 28 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1985), appealdocketed,
No. 85-6282 (2d Cir. Sept. 27, 1985); COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. 844, 846 (D.D.C. 1984),
appeal docketed, No. 84-5890 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 1984).
11. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420, 435 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd,
761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10,
1985) (No. 85-411). It is argued that price discrimination against U.S. consumers is evidenced by the maintenance of two separate price structures-one abroad and a higher
one in the U.S. market. See Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1166
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Vivitar Corp., 593 F. Supp. at 435; see also Parfums Stern, Inc. v.
United States Customs Serv., 575 F. Supp. 416, 421 (S.D. Fla. 1983) ("the Court would
be doing the public a disservice by preventing the dissemination of.. . less expensive
...products"); United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
(defendants found to have "exploit[ed] world markets"), vacated, 358 U.S. 915 (1958);
Atwood, supra note 9, at 308 ("Different arms of the same company should not be able to
maintain two separate price structures for the same product, one price being above that
which the market would seek if importers could compete freely."); Power of TradeMark
Owner, supra note 8, at 564 ("The employment of [§ 526] by related firms protects neither
the reputation of the trade-mark owner nor the authenticity of its products. It merely
results in higher prices to consumers.").
The price differential, however, is more likely caused by factors: (1) the currency fluctuations and strength of the U.S. dollar abroad, see Osawa & Co., 589 F. Supp. at 1166;
Collado Associates, supra note 6, at 66-69; Riley, 'Gray Market' Fight Isn't Black and
White, Natl Law J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 1, (2) overhead costs of advertising, promotion and
warranty service borne by the U.S. trademark owner, see Vivitar Corp., 593 F. Supp. at
435; Osawa & Co., 589 F. Supp. at 1166 n.3; Collado Associates, supra note 6, at 16-21,
and (3) relative lower costs of this overhead abroad, see Vivitar Corp , 593 F. Supp. at
435.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part I.B.
14. See infra Part I.D.2.
15. See infra Part I.D.1 for a discussion of the history of Customs' interpretations.
16. Compare Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(genuine goods infringe the U.S. trademark despite the regulations and relationship between the U.S. trademark owner and its foreign manufacturer) and Bell & Howelh
Mamiya & Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (same), vacated
on other grounds, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983) with Olympus Corp. v. United States, No.
CV-84-0920 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1985) (regulations correctly interpret the statute), appeal docketed, No. 85-6282 (2d Cir. Sept. 27, 1985) and Vivitar Corp. v. United States,
593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) (same), aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
petition for cert filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411).
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private remedy provided by section 526(c).7 This Part concludes that
the Customs regulations advance discredited antitrust and trademark
principles and that the private remedy provided in section 526(c) inadequately protects the U.S. trademark owner. Part III analyzes recently
proposed solutions to the grey market problem.1 8 This Note concludes
that the current administrative interpretation of section 526 is an impermissible and unfair barrier to the exercise of a statutory right and that an
unqualified exclusion of grey market imports provides the only adequate
protection for the U.S. trademark owner.
I.

THE GENUINE GoODs EXCLUSION ACT

The history and language of section 526 mandate exclusion of grey
market goods. Moreover, ordinary justifications for ignoring the plain
meaning of a statute, such as the controlling authority of the regulations
or a consistent administrative interpretation, are absent.
A. Principles of Statutory Construction

Customs' use of the legislative history of section 526 to defeat its plain

meaning is not based on sound principles of statutory analysis. 9 Without a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, 20 the plain
17. See 19 U.S.C. § 1526(c) (1982):
Any person dealing in any such merchandise may be enjoined from dealing
therein within the United States or may be required to export or destroy such
merchandise or to remove or obliterate such trademark and shall be liable for
the same damages and profits provided for wrongful use of a trademark, under
the provisions of sections 81 to 109 of Title 15.
Id.
18. The Working Group on Intellectual Property, comprised of officials from the Office of Management and Budget, the Council of Economic Advisors, the Treasury Department, the Commerce Department, the State Department, the Justice Department and
the U.S. Trade Representative is considering options from which it will choose one as a
recommended solution to the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade. Inside U.S.
Trade 17, April 26, 1985, at 1. See infra notes 172-208 and accompanying text for a
detailed discussion of these options.
19. The Justice Department has conceded that exempting related companies from
protection is not supported by a literal reading of the statute. See Appellee's Motion to
Vacate at 7, Guerlain, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 915 (1958). Other authorities agree.
See Olympus Corp. v. United States, No. CV-84-0920, slip op. at 29 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22,
1985) ("Section 526 read literally would indeed give [the U.S. trademark owner] the right
to exclude all goods bearing [the registered U.S. trademark]."), appeal docketed, No. 856282 (2d Cir. Sept. 27, 1985); Kuhn, Remedies Available at Customsfor Infringement of a
Registered Trade-Mark, 70 Trade-Mark Rep. 387, 394 (1980) ("There is no legislative
basis for this interpretation, since Section 526(a) specifies no exceptions.").
Customs, however, now uses the statute's legislative history to support its position that
its regulations correctly implement the statute's plain meaning. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 20-29, Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Brief for
Appellee at 23-30, COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal docketed, No. 845890 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 1984).
20. While Congressional intent can often be found in legislative history, see British
Steel Corp. v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 1145, 1148 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), courts confronted with determining legislative intent must "construe what Congress has written.
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meaning of a statute must be conclusive."
The statute provides:
it shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise
of foreign manufacture if such merchandise, or the label, sign, print,
package, wrapper, or receptacle, bears a trademark owned by a citizen

of, or by a corporation or association created or organized within, the
United States, and registered in the Patent and Trademark Office...
unless written consent of the
owner of such trademark is produced at
22
the time of making entry.

A literal interpretation of section 526 is more reasonable than a nonliteral interpretation. The literal interpretation protects trademark owners for whom the statute was enacted,' rather than anonymous
diverters.
Proponents of the Customs' regulations "snatch fragments" ' of the
Senate floor debates to conclude that Congress intended to protect tradeAfter all, Congress expresses its purpose by words. It is for [the courts] to ascertainneither to add nor to subtract, neither to delete nor to distort." 62 Cases of Jam v.
United States, 340 U.S. 593, 596 (1951). There must be a showing from the structure and
history of the act that the plain intent of Congress is something other than the letter of
the statute. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 n.33 (1978); see also Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983) (statutory language does not control if a clearly
demonstrated Congressional intent requires a different conclusion).
21. See United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 560 (1982); Consumer Product Safety
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). Thus, in construing a statute,
courts are required first to look to the plain meaning of the words used. FTC v. Bunte
Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 350 (1941); Intercontinental Fibres, Inc. v. United States, 545 F.2d
744, 746 (C.C.P.A. 1976); United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 573
(C.C.P.A. 1975); R. Sturm, Customs Law and Administration 387 (1980). The customs
and tariff laws are intended for "practical use and application by men engaged in commerce" and must be given the meaning such men would assign. Stone & Downer Co. v.
United States, 12 C.C.A. 62, 71 (1923) (quoting Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.)
137, 151 (1836)).
The plain meaning is conclusive unless a literal construction leads to an anomaly, see
Intercontinental Fibres, Inc. v. United States, 545 F.2d 744, 746 (C.C.P.A. 1976); R.
Sturm, supra, at 393; see also United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1979)
(non-literal construction of a section used when literal construction frustrates the purpose
of Act), or an absurd result, see Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S.
457, 460 (1892) which is so gross as to shock common sense, see Crooks v. Harrelson, 282
U.S. 55, 60 (1930); Abdalla v. Commissioner, 647 F.2d 487, 497 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting
Crooks, 282 U.S. at 60); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Chesapeake & O.R.R., 229 F.2d 721, 727
(6th Cir. 1956) (same); Porter v. Nowak, 157 F.2d 824, 825-26 (Ist Cir. 1946) (same);
United States v. Roy, 597 F. Supp. 1210, 1220 (D. Conn. 1984) (same). Non-literal construction of a statute can apply to override the liberal words of a statute "only under rare
and exceptional circumstances," Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930), particularly when the statute is written in unambiguous terms. Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S.
424, 430 (1981); see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 & n.33 (1978) (quoting Crooks v.
Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930)).
22. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982).
23. See infra Part LB and accompanying text. Congress enacted § 526 to protect U.S.
trademark owners from importation of unauthorized goods.
24. See infra note 167 and accompanying text for a discussion of the closely guarded
secret of diverter's identity.
25. Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).

90

FORDHAMLAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

mark owners only in one specific fact pattern.2 6 Isolated remarks from
Senate floor debates, however, are unreliable indicia of legislative in-

tent.27 Moreover, even if the courts were to study legislative history to
form a non-literal interpretation, they would find that the history compels use of the statute's plain meaning.2"
B.

The Legislative History

Prior to the enactment of section 526 in 1922,29 goods that bore a genuine trademark-genuine goods-- 3 0 were not excluded by Customs because their importation and sale was not trademark infringement under
section 27 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905.31
In accord with this result, United States Court of Appeals for the Sec26. The fact pattern is that of A. Bouijois v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 690-92 (1923)
where the U.S. trademark owner was completely independent from the foreign
manufacturer.
27. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118
(1980); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979); McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1931); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S.
443, 474 (1921). Indeed, courts addressing § 526 have discussed the improper use of its
legislative history. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1563 (Fed. Cir.
1985) ("[Ihe remarks of one or more Senators are an unreliable indication of the sense of
the chamber as a whole or of Congress."), petitionfor cert.filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S.
Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411); Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F.
Supp. 1063, 1075 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) ("mThe possibility that individual senators may not
have understood precisely how the Bourjois Company's American trademark rights were
being encroached upon cannot weigh heavily in construing the statute when the breadth
of the language used in the legislation is properly considered."), vacated on other grounds,
719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
28. See infra Part I.B and accompanying text for a complete discussion of this issue.
See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (concluding that
overruling Katzel was not the "sole purpose" of § 526) (emphasis in original), petitionfor
cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411).
29. Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, tit. III, § 526, 42 Stat. 858, 975.
30. These goods are not counterfeit, rather they are unauthorized by the U.S. trademark owner for sale in the U.S. market. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d
1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10,
1985) (No. 85-411). See supra note 4 for a discussion of grey market goods.
31. See Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 (current version at § 42 of the
Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982)). This section provided in part: "No
article of imported merchandise which shall copy or simulate. . . a trade-mark registered in accordance with the provisions of this Act. . . shall be admitted to entry at any
custom-house of the United States ...
." Id. at 730.
Before the enactment of § 526, courts denied use of a U.S. trademark to exclude genuine imports. See, e.g., Hunyadi Janos Corp. v. Stoeger, 285 F. 861 (2d Cir. 1922) (permitting the importation of genuine goods); Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780,
782 (2d Cir. 1916) (same); Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886)
(same); see also Takamatsu, ParallelImportationof Trademarked Goods: A Comparative
Analysis, 57 Wash. L. Rev. 433, 434 (1982) (if the importer legitimately acquired the
genuine goods abroad, the U.S. trademark owner could not exclude the goods).
Section 42 is invoked today, often in conjunction with § 526, to prohibit importation of
genuine goods. See, e.g., Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1165, 1179
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063,
1066, 1079 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
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ond Circuit, in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel,3 2 vacated a preliminary injunction barring importation of genuine JAVA facepowder by a third
party. 3 Partly in response to that decision, while the case was on appeal
to the Supreme Court,' Congress enacted section 526 as part of the
Tariff Act of 1922.11 Congress did not consider changing the existing
trademark laws, choosing instead to amend the Tariff Act to give U.S.
trademark owners the right to exclude genuine goods.3 6 Athough the
initial impetus for section 526 was the Second Circuit's Katzel decision,3 7

the Senate debates indicate clearly that Congress did not intend to limit
32. 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
33. A. Bouijois & Co. purchased the U.S. business and U.S. trademark rights for
JAVA, a French facepowder, from the French manufacturer. See id at 539. Katzel
purchased genuine JAVA facepowder in France, imported it into the U.S., and sold it
under the JAVA trademark. See id at 540. Relying on the theory that genuine goods
could not infringe a U.S. trademark, the Second Circuit vacated the district court's injunction against importing the powder. See id. at 543.
For the purposes of this Note a third party or a diverter is a person or entity unrelated
to either the U.S. trademark owner or the foreign manufacturer who lawfully purchases
abroad merchandise bearing U.S. registered trademarks and imports them for sale in the
U.S. without the authorization of the U.S. trademark owners.
34. A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
The Supreme Court, in a short opinion by Justice Holmes, reversed and reinstated the
district court's injunction finding that the trademark signifies the local goodwill of the
domestic trademark owner rather than the manufacturer of the goods. See id. at 692.
Thus, the genuine JAVA imports were deemed to infringe on the rights of the U.S. trademark owner. See infra Part 11.B and accompanying text for a discussion of the territorial
nature of trademarks.
35. Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, tit. m, § 526, 42 Stat. 858, 975. The Second Circuit's
opinion was dated June 8, 1921, see A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539, 539 (2d Cir.
1921), the Supreme Court reversed on January 29, 1923, see A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel,
260 U.S. 689, 689 (1923). Section 526 was enacted into law on September 21, 1922. See
Tariff Act of 1922, tit. III, § 526, 42 Stat. 858, 975.
36. See H.R. Rep. No. 1223, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1922); 62 Cong. Rec. 11,60205 (1922); see also Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
("Congress did not debate or intend to change trademark law to make uniform what the
various courts might hold to be infringements. Rather, it ignored trademark law and, by
amendment to customs law, gave a U.S. owner of a trademark a right to exclude foreign
goods bearing the same trademark as the U.S. company had registered in the U.S. and
recorded with Customs."), petitionfor cert filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985)
(No. 85-411).
37. The legislative history of this amendment is short, consisting only of a ten-minute
Senate debate, see 62 Cong. Rec. 11,585 (1922), and a brief Conference Report which
read:
A recent decision of the circuit court of appeals [Katzel] holds that existing
law does not prevent the importation of merchandise bearing the same trademark as merchandise of the United States, if the imported merchandise is genuine and if there is no fraud upon the public. The Senate amendment makes such
importation unlawful without the consent of the owner of the American trademark, in order to protect the American manufacturer or producer; and the
House recedes with an amendment requiring that the trade-mark be owned, at
the time of the importation, by a citizen of the United States or by a corporation
or association created or organized within the United States.
H.R. Rep. No. 1223, 67th Cong. 2d Sess. 158 (1922).
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the section to fact patterns identical to Katzel.3" Indeed, the only requirement for applicability was registration and recordation of a U.S.
trademark.3 9 Evidence of trademark infringement was irrelevant. 4°
38. The Senate floor debate shows that Congress intended § 526 to apply to fact patterns other than those found in Katzel. Initially, § 526 was to apply to all goods, including those manufactured in the United States, exported and subsequently imported back to
the United States. See 62 Cong. Rec. 11,602 (1922) (statement of Sen. Kellogg). Senator
McCumber proposed an amendment limiting § 526 to trademarked goods of foreign
manufacture to avoid the problem of U.S. citizens returning from abroad with goods
produced domestically, but purchased abroad. See id. at 11,603 (1922) (statement of Sen.
McCumber). Senator Simmons supported the legislation because he wished to protect
the American company which acquired the BAYER trademark from the Allen Property
Custodian. See id. at 11,604 (statement of Sen. Simmons). Finally, Senator Lenroot envisaged monopolization by multinational concerns, such as the makers of PEARS soap,
by assigning their U.S. trademark to an American agent. See id. at 11,605 (1922) (statement of Sen. Lenroot). This amendment and remarks made during the debates provide
evidence that limitations cannot be read into the statute based on Congressional intent at
the time of enactment. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1562-65 (Fed. Cir.
1985), petition for cert.filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411). But
see Olympus Corp. v. United States, No. CV-84-0920, slip op. at 30-31 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
22, 1985) (§ 526 is limited to Katzel-type fact patterns), appealdocketed, No. 85-6282 (2d
Cir. Sept. 27, 1985); COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. 844, 852 (D.D.C. 1984) (same), appealdocketed, No. 84-5890 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 1984); Parfums Stem, Inc. v. United States Customs Serv., 575 F. Supp. 416, 419 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (same).
Reliance upon this short legislative history to conclude that only fact patterns identical
to Katzel permit U.S. trademark owners to exercise § 526 is further undercut by the
misinformation on which the Senators were relying. Senator Sutherland was under the
impression that in Katzel, the French manufacturer, not a third party, was importing the
goods into the United States in violation of the agreement it made with the plaintiff. See
62 Cong. Rec. 11,603 (1922) (statement of Sen. Sutherland). Either no one chose to
correct Senator Sutherland or the entire Senate was misinformed about the facts. Under
these circumstances, it is difficult to read limitations into the amendment without knowing to which fact pattern § 526 should be limited. Thus, the legislative history of § 526 at
the time of its enactment offers little insight into congressionally intended limitations.
See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1563, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1985), petition
for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411). But see Power of
TradeMark Owner, supra note 8, at 566 (legislative history of § 526 suggests it was enacted solely for "independent" U.S. trademark owners).
39. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
40. Evidence of infringement as a prerequisite to protection under § 526 was never
discussed in Congress. See 62 Cong. Rec. 11,602-05 (1922).
Bearing in mind that the Second Circuit's decisions, particularly the Gretsch
and Appollonaris cases, had declared that a manufacturer's goods did not infringe American trademark rights because they were "genuine," it becomes
plain that Congress wanted it absolutely clear that sharing a common foreign
manufacturing origin with the American trademark owner's goods did not
make other similarly or identically trademarked goods purchased abroad any
less infringing. Again without limiting language, Congress stated that "any
merchandise of foreign manufacture" bearing a trademark owned by an American could be denied entry, on the unstated, but obvious ground that sale of the
article by someone not the trademark owner would infringe the trademark
owner's rights.
Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063, 1076 (E.D.N.Y.
1982), vacated on other grounds, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Vivitar Corp. v.
United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("Ownership of a U.S. trademark
registration was a condition to an exercise of that right [to invoke § 526], but trademark

1985]

GREY MARKET GOODS

Section 526 was reenacted in the Tariff Act of 1930.41 Prior to reenactment, in an effort to encourage domestic production of goods, the Senate considered deleting the privilege of the domestic trademark owner to
give written consent to importation.4 2 The premise of the amendment
was that section 526 prohibited foreign-made goods bearing registered

and recorded trademarks regardless of whether the importer was a related company.4 3 The amendment was rejected by Congress
and section
4

526 was reenacted with the written consent privilege.
Since the 1930 reenactment,

5

there have been several unsuccessful

congressional attempts to limit the scope of section 526. In 1954, legislation was proposed which would have limited the protection of section
526 to American trademark owners who were unrelated to foreign
infringement by the importer was not."), petition for cert filed, 54 U.S.LW. 3178 (U.S.

Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411).
The court in COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. 844, 851 (D.D.C. 1984), appealdocketed, No. 845890 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 1984), however, finding that the statutory language of § 526 did
not bar genuine goods, relied on Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1886) and Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916) for the proposition that § 526 only prohibited importing merchandise which copied or simulated registered trademarks. The flaw in this reasoning is apparent. Apollinaris and Gretsch were
decided prior to the 1922 enactment of § 526. Section 526 was enacted to provide an
exclusion of genuine goods for U.S. trademark owners, regardless of evidence of infringement. See Vivitar Corp., 761 F.2d at 1563.
Further support that evidence of infringement is irrelevant is found in § 526(c), which
provides the same remedy for damages due to importation of genuine goods as § 27 of the
Trade-Mark Act of 1905 does for importation of infringing goods. If § 526 was to be
limited to infringements, § 526(c) would have been unnecessary: "that remedy was already available in the Act of 1905." Vivitar Corp., 761 F.2d at 1564.
41. See Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, tit. IV, § 526, 46 Stat. 590, 741 (current version at
19 U.S.C. § 526(a) (1982)).
42. See R-R. 2667, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. 172 (1929) (attempting to delete the portion
of § 526(a) which reads "unless written consent of the owner of such trade-mark is produced at the time of making entry"); 71 Cong. Rec. 3873 (1929) (discussing the attempted deletion).
43. 71 Cong. Rec. at 3873-76 (1929). Supporters of a narrow reading of § 526 have
used Senator Reed's floor statement, see 71 Cong. Rec. 3873 (1929) (statement of Sen.
Reed), to justify their position. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420, 428
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), affid, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), petition for cert filed, 54
U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411). Senator Reed stated:
At the present time the tariff laws forbid the importation of an article bearing a
trade-mark registered in America unless the owner of that trade-mark consents
in writing to the importation. Obviously the purpose of that provision is to
protect the American owner of the trade-mark against importations of articles
which have been stamped with his mark without his consent.
71 Cong. Rec. 3873 (1929) (statement of Sen. Reed).
The poor placement of the modifier "without his consent" changes the meaning of the
Senator's statement depending on whether it modifies "stamped" or "importations."
This ambiguous remark, however, cannot override the broad reading given to § 526 by
Congress at the time of reenactment. See Vivitar Corp., 761 F.2d at 1566 n.19.
44. See Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, tit. IV, § 526, 46 Stat. 590, 741 (current version at
19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982)).
45. Id.

94

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

manufacturers.46
In 1959, a congressional attempt to repeal section 526 failed. 7 This is
particularly noteworthy because in 1958 in United States v. Guerlain,
Inc y4 the District Court for the Southern District of New York found
that use of section 526 by an "international enterprise ' 49 to exclude genuine goods of foreign manufacturers violated section 2 of the Sherman
Act 5 0 The Supreme Court, at the request of the Justice Department,"1
vacated the judgment.5 2 The unusual request was based in parts ' on a
desire to propose legislation to remedy a perceived misuse of section 526
to monopolize the U.S. market by international enterprises.5 4 The Executive's subsequent inability to persuade Congress to limit the scope of
section 526 implies that Congress did not want the section to be
restricted.
A bill to amend the Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946 was introduced
in Congress in 1969.ss This bill also proposed repeal of section 526.56
Again, Congress declined to limit the protection afforded a U.S. trade57
mark owner.
An amendment in 1978 created a statutory exemption for imports for
46. See S.2540, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1954); H.R. 9476, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1954).

47. See H.R. 7234, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in 49 Trade-Mark Rep.
671, 671-73 (1959); see also Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F.
Supp. 1063, 1078 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (reviewing the proposed amendment to repeal § 526),
vacated on other grounds, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
48. 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated, 358 U.S. 915 (1958).

49. Id. at 82. All the defendants in this consolidated action were "associated" with
their foreign manufacturers. Id. at 80.
50. See id. at 87. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)), provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony ....

Id.
51. See Appellee's Motion to Vacate, Guerlain, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 915

(1958).
52. See Guerlain, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 915, 915 (1958).
53. The Justice Department's motion to vacate was also based on a conflict with the
Customs Service regarding the application of § 526. The Customs Service took the position that related defendants should be protected by the statute. The Justice Department
conceded that Customs' position was supported by a literal reading of the statute. See
Appellee's Motion to Vacate at 7, Guerlain, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 915 (1958).
54. Appellee's Motion to Vacate at 7-8, Guerlain, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 915
(1958) (The Departments of Justice, Treasury, State and Commerce joined to propose
legislation which would prohibit the use of § 526 by related companies. The executive
branch conceded that the legislature "is best equipped to deal" with the prohibition.)
Despite this concerted effort, Congress rejected the amendment. See supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
55. S. 3713, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 Cong. Rec. 19,446 (1968).
56. See id.; Atwood, supra note 9, at 320.
57. S.3713, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
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personal use58 and a procedure to be followed by Customs when it discovers a counterfeit mark. 9 Again, neither the general
scope nor any
6
specific limitations of section 526 were discussed. 0
Some courts have accepted Customs' position that congressional silence in the face Customs' implementation of section 526 must be

equated with congressional approval of the regulations.6 1 However, congressional silence does not imply ratification of the current practices of

the Customs Service.62

58. See Act of Oct. 3, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-410, tit. II, § 211(a), 92 Stat. 888, 903
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1526(d) (1982)).
59. See Act of Oct. 3, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-410, tit. II, § 211(c), 92 Stat. 888, 903
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e) (1982)).
60. The conference reports submitted by both the Senate and the House make no
reference to the general scope of § 526 or to any limitations. See S. Rep. No. 778, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H. Rep. No. 1517, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
61. See, eg., Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420, 432-33 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984), affid, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), petition for cerL filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178
(U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411); COPL4T, 598 F. Supp. 844, 852 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal docketed, No. 84-5890 (D.C.Cir. Dec. 28, 1984).
Customs, relying on two identical reports submitted to the House, maintains that Congress accepted Customs' interpretation of § 526. One report was prepared as background
for the proposed Customs Modernization Act of 1975, which was never enacted. See
H.R. 9220, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975). The other was prepared by the House Ways and
Means Committee in connection with the Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-410, 92 Stat. 888, 903 (current version at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1526(d), (e) (1982)).
[Section 526] has been consistently interpreted by the United States Customs
Service for the past 20 years as excluding from protection foreign-produced
merchandise bearing a genuine trade-mark created, owned, and registered by a
citizen of the United States if the foreign producer has been authorized by the
American trade-mark owner to produce and sell abroad goods bearing the recorded trade-mark.
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Background Materials on H..
9220, The Proposed Customs Modernization Act of 1975 54 (Comm. Print 1976); H.P
Rep. No. 621, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1977).
However, Customs had not consistently interpreted § 526 during the 20 years prior to
these statements. See infra Part I.D.1. See also Vivitar Corp., 761 F.2d at 1568 (disagreeing with the lower court's finding of an implied ratification of Customs' practices).
62. Reenactment of a statute does not constitute Congressional approval of administrative construction and interpretation of a statute. See Plasterer's Local Union No. 79 v.
NLRB, 440 F.2d 174, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 116 (1971).
But see McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488, 493 (193 1) (statutes reenactment is "at least persuasive of a legislative recognition and approval of the statute as
construed"). To find approval of an administrative practice, "Congress must not only
have been made aware of the administrative interpretation, but must also have given
some 'affirmative indication' of such intent." Association of Am. R.Rs. v. ICC, 564 F.2d
486, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1568 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) ("Legislation by total silence is too tenuous a theory to merit extended discussion."), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411); C.
Sands, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 49.09 (Chadbourne rev. 4th ed. 1984)
(reenactment of a statute is considered to continue a contemporaneous and practical interpretation unless the legislature never focused its attention on the interpretation).
Moreover, were a court to find the House reports correct, it would have to find these
House reports are insufficient indicia of legislative intent to accept Customs' interpretation. See Vivitar Corp., 761 F.2d at 1568. "[L]anguage in a Committee Report, without
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To the contrary, the complete legislative history of section 526 is more
reasonably interpreted as showing Congress' steadfast refusal, despite extensive lobbying, 63 to limit the protection afforded to all U.S. trademark
owners by the plain meaning of section 526.
C.

ContemporaryJudicialInterpretations

The holdings of several courts" made contemporaneously with either
the 1922 enactment6 5 or the 1930 reenactment 66 of section 526 contradict
Customs' assertion that the statute is limited to Katzel fact patterns.
Moreover, these opinions support giving the plain meaning of section 526
its full effect.
The Supreme Court in A. Bourdois & Co. v. Aldridge67 found that the
sale of genuine goods in the American market by a third party diverter
was an infringement of the U.S. trademark owner's registered trademark,
and thus excluded the goods. 68 A violation of section 27 of the TradeMark Act of 1905 was found despite the defendant's attempt to import
additional indication of more widespread congressional awareness, is simply not sufficient" to support a finding that an administrative practice has been congressionally ratified. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121 (1978).
The court in COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. 844, (D.D.C. 1984), appeal docketed, No. 84-5890
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 1984), relied in part on Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 297-98 (1981), for
the proposition that the 1978 amendments of § 526 amounted to Congressional approval
of Customs' interpretation. See COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 852. The Agee court, however,
was balancing the rights of a person whose passport had been revoked in the interest of
national security. The State Department undoubtedly is entrusted with vast discretion in
the areas of national security and foreign policy. See Agee, 453 U.S. at 290-91. The
Court stated that "congressional silence is not to be equated with congressional disapproval." Id. at 291. Customs, however, is not entrusted with the same degree of discretion. The statute construed in Agee, The Passport Act of 1926, 22 U.S.C. § 21 la, granted
"'broad ruie-making authority"' to the State Department. 453 U.S. at 291 (quoting
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 12 (1965)). No such authority was granted to Customs in
§ 526. See Vivitar Corp., 761 F.2d at 1569. Indeed, the regulations Customs has promulgated are "not controlling." Id. at 1570.
63. See supra notes 46-62 and accompanying text.
64. A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923) (per curiam); Sturges v. Clark
D. Pease, Inc., 48 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1931); Coty, Inc. v. Le Blume Import Co., 292 F.
264 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 293 F. 344 (2d Cir. 1923).
65. Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, tit. III, § 526, 42 Stat. 858, 975.
66. See Act of June 17, 1930, ch. 497, tit. IV, § 526, 46 Stat. 741.
67. 263 U.S. 675 (1923) (per curiam). On appeal to the Supreme Court, the following
two questions were certified by the Second Circuit: "(1) Is the sale in the United States of
[defendant's goods] an infringement of plaintiff's registered trade-marks? (2) Is the collector, by section 27 of the Trade-Mark Law, required to exclude from entry genuine
[goods]. . .made in France?" A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge, 292 F. 1013, 1014 (2d Cir.
1922) (per curiam), decided per curiam, 263 U.S. 675 (1923).
68. The facts of this case closely paralleled the facts in A. Bouijois v. Katzel, 275 F.
539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923), see supra notes 32-35 and accompanying
text, except that the plaintiff was seeking to protect a different trademark and sought
relief from Customs as well as the diverter who legally purchased the product with the
identical trademark from the same manufacturer in France. A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge, 292 F. 1013, 1014 (2d Cir. 1922) (per curiam), decidedpercuriam, 263 U.S. 675
(1923).
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genuine goods legally purchased abroad.69 Aldridge recognizes that exclusion of genuine goods should not be limited to technical and individual infringement determinatons7 ° made by some courts today.7 ' Thus,
after Aldridge, unauthorized genuine goods could be excluded by the use
of either section 27 or section 526.72

Similarly, in Coty, Ina v. Le Blume Import Co., 73 neither the district
nor the circuit court considered the significance of Coty's foreign corporate ownership,74 a circumstance that would have prohibited Coty from

invoking section 526 in the first instance.75 This example shows the in-

significance of related company status.76

After the 1930 reenactment of section 526, the Second Circuit in

Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Ina I rejected the argument that section 526
was limited to the facts in Katzel. Judge Augustus Hand characterized
69. See A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675, 676 (1923) (per curiam).
70. The Supreme Court overruled previous constructions of § 27 of the Trade-Mark
Act of 1905 and its predecessor, finding that genuine goods did not infringe, e.&, Hunyadi Janos Corp. v. Stoeger, 285 F. 861, 864 (2d Cir. 1922); Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v.
Schoening, 238 F. 780, 781-82 (2d Cir. 1916); Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18, 20
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886), on the authority of its decision in A. Bouriois & Co. v. Katzel, 260
U.S. 689 (1923). The Court answered both questions certified by the Second Circuit, see
supra note 67, in the affirmative, finding that sale of the genuine goods infringed plaintiff's
trademark, and that Customs was required to bar their importation. A. Bourjois & Co. v.
Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675, 676 (1923) (per curiam); see Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761
F.2d 1552, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 1985), petitionfor cerL filed, 54 U.S.LW. 3178 (U.S. Sept.
10, 1985) (No. 85-411); Power of Trade-Mark Owner, supra note 8, at 558 & .9.
71. See, e-g., Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l (Am.) Corp., 707 F.2d 1054,
1056 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding no infringement); El Greco Leather Prod. Co. v. Shoe
World Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1380, 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (same).
72. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1985),petition
for cert filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411); Bell & Howel:
Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063, 1074 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), iacatedon
other grounds, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983). Section 526 has the additional remedy of
seizure and forfeiture at Customs. See 19 U.S.C. § 1526(c) (1982).
73. 292 F. 264 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 293 F. 344 (2d Cir. 1923).
74. Coty was a French citizen importing perfumes into the United States through its
United States commercial representative, Coty, Inc. Id. at 265. Le Blume brought a suit
to compel Coty and Coty, Inc. to withdraw their § 526 exclusion. Id. at 265, 268-69. In
denying Coty's motion to dismiss, neither the district court nor the Second Circuit considered the significance of Coty's foreign ownership. See id.
75. Both courts merely interpreted the plain meaning of the statute: foreign affiliation
was not considered as a possible bar to Coty's ability to invoke § 526. See Osawa & Co.
v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Bell & Howell: Mariya Co. v.
Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063, 1076 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), acated on other
grounds, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983). See supra notes 1, 37-40 and accompanying text.
76. For it is clear (and beyond dispute) that exclusion lay under § 27 against
goods that "copy or simulate" regardless of [the] relationship between the domestic and the foreign mark holder. Such a relationship would have no conceivable relevance to the unlawfulness of a counterfeit mark. If, as Judge
[Learned] Hand states [Im Coty, Inc. v. Le Blume Import Co., 292 F. 264, 26869 (S.D.N.Y.), afftd, 293 F. 344 (2d Cir. 1923)], § 526 simply fills the omission
supposed to exist in § 27, then the relationship between foreign and domestic
markholder would be equally irrelevant under § 526.
Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1175-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
77. 48 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1931) (A. Hand, J.).
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the statute as "drastic,"78 giving the U.S. trademark owner the right to
bar all merchandise bearing its trademark.79 Athough the court recog-

nized that section 526 was enacted to provide a remedy to U.S. trademark owners in Katzel-type situations, that purpose did "not settle the
scope of the act."

0

Thus, courts that interpreted section 526 soon after its passage concluded that Congress intended a literal reading of the statute based on its
plain meaning.
D. Administrative Interpretations
1. Customs Service's Lack of Consistency.
The degree of judicial deference given to an administrative agency's

interpretation of a statute depends on several factors.81 One important

factor is whether the administrative agency's interpretation of the statute

has been consistent.82 A review of Customs' interpretations3 since the
statute's enactment demonstrates the agency's inconsistency.

The first regulations promulgated by Customs following the enactment
of section 526 in 192384 contained neither administrative exceptions nor
any indication of the agency's interpretation. 5

Regulations issued in conjunction with the 1930 reenactment of sec78. See id. at 1037.
79. See id. at 1036-38. The plaintiff had purchased an automobile abroad and sought
to import it for his personal use. Id. at 1036. The automobile was affixed with a trademark, the exclusive U.S. rights to which were owned by the defendant. Id. Since the
defendant had not authorized the importation, and there was no personal use exception
to § 526 at that time, see supra note 58 and accompanying text, the plaintiff was unable to
import the automobile. See id. at 1036-38; see also Takamatsu, supra note 31, at 436.
80. Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc., 48 F.2d 1035, 1037 (2d Cir. 1931). However,
"[t]he fact that [§ 526] was passed to overturn the Court of Appeals decision in Katzel
does not mean that, in spite of its broad language, it should govern only the narrowest
version of the Katzel facts." Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1175
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); see Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc., 48 F.2d 1035, 1037 (2d Cir. 1931).
81. Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S.
27, 37 (1981); 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 5.06, at 324 (1958); see B.
Schwartz, Administrative Law § 10.19, at 621 (2d ed. 1984).
82. Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S.
27, 37 (1981); 1 K. Davis, supra note 81, § 5.06, at 324; B. Schwartz, supra note 81,
§ 10.19, at 621.
83. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1565-68 (Fed. Cir. 1985), petition
for cert filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411); see generallyAtwood,
supra note 9, at 301 ("review of Customs administration of trademark laws over the past
50 years shows that the Government's practice, or policy, has not remained constant").
See infra notes 84-107 and accompanying text.
84. Customs Regulations of 1923, Art. 475-80, (superseded 1930). "Trade-marks
owned by an American citizen. . . are entitled to the protection of section 526. . .if the
mark has been registered. . . " Id. Art. 476.
85. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420, 428-29 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984), aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W.
3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411); Customs Regulations of 1923, Art. 475-80 (superseded 1930).
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tion 52686 barred genuine goods unless the U.S. trademark owner provided written consent to importation. 7
I In 1936, Customs deleted reference to section 526 from the regula-

tions.88 Goods prohibited by section 526 were deemed for purposes of

the regulations to be those bearing trademarks which copy or simulate8 9

a registered trademark. The 1936 regulations excluded, for the first time,

trademarks owned by related companies. 90

Customs regulations promulgated in 1953 again excluded related companies from protection.9" Despite these regulations, in practice Customs
86. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, tit. IV, § 526, 46 Stat. 590, 741 (current version at 19
U.S.C. § 1526 (1982)).
87. Prohibition of entry.-Entry is prohibited of imported merchandise bearing
a genuine trade-mark when such trade-mark is recorded with the Treasury Department and registered under the trade-mark law of February 20, 1905, if compliance is had with all provisions of section 526 of the tariff act of 1930,
provided the period of protection for such trade-mark has not expired.
Customs Regulations of 1931, Art. 518(a) (superseded 1936). Customs' interpretation
that genuine goods were to be excluded was "absolute." Vivitar Corp. v. United States,
761 F.2d 1552, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1985),petitionfor cert.filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept.
10, 1985) (No. 85-411).
88. See T.D. 48,537, 70 Treas. Dec. 336 (1936) (superseded 1953). Customs completely revised the regulations in 1936 and provided that merchandise that copied or
simulated a trademark was protected under Section 27 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905
unless the U.S. and foreign trademark owners were "owned by the same person, partnership, association, or corporation." Id. at 337. The regulations regarding prohibition of
entry made no reference to § 526. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. However, it is clear from a report by the U.S. Tariff Commission (now the
International Trade Commission) to the House Subcommittee on Patents, that the reference to related companies in the 1936 regulations was not intended to apply to § 526:
Section 526. .. applies to the registrant's own merchandise and prohibits importation of ... trade-marked merchandise unless the registrant agrees
thereto. If the registrant withholds his consent to the importation, the merchandise is excluded from entry. In other words, the Federal authority to exclude from entry the particular goods is in effect exercised or not exercised at
the option of the owner of the trade-mark.

. .

. Section 526 of the tariff act

does apply to the merchandise of the trade-mark owner which bears his trademark if the merchandise was produced abroad and if the trade-mark owner is a
citizen of the United States.
An Act to Providefor the Registration and Protection of Trade-Marks Used in Commerce,
to Carry Out the Provisionsof Certain InternationalConventions, andfor Other Purposer
Hearings on H.R. 82 Before A Subcomm. of the Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.
86-87 (1944). This report was part of a submission to Congress during the hearings in
1944 to recodify the trademark laws. This recodification ultimately resulted in the Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072, 1091-1096, 1111-1121, 1123-1127
(1982).
91. See 19 C.F.R. § 11.14 (1953), T.D. 53,399, 88 Treas. Dec. 383-84 (1953) (superseded 1959). The 1953 regulations again referred to related companies, but this time as
defined by § 45 of the Lanham Act:
The term "related company" means any person who legitimately controls or
is controlled by the registrant or applicant for registration in respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services in connection with which the mark is
used.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982). This definition also encompassed licensees. See Vivitar Corp. v.
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excluded genuine goods regardless of whether the U.S. trademark owner
was related to the foreign manufacturer.9 2 Evidence of Customs' practice of exclusion is found in the Justice Department's motion to vacate
the lower court's finding of Sherman Act violations in Guerlain.9 3 In
that case, the Justice Department stated that the Customs Service was
"legally constrained to grant the claim of statutory protection ' 94 to an
international enterprise.
After Guerlain, Customs reverted to its pre-1936 position by deleting
the related company exception. 95 The 1959 regulations removed protection only from those U.S. trademark owners whose foreign affiliate was
the same entity. 9 6 This exception, however, was limited to principal/
agent relationships. 9
In 1972, the Customs regulations were revised to their present form. 98
The new regulations not only contain the same entity limitation9 9 found
in the 1953 and 1959 regulations," °° but also exclude from statutory protection all U.S. trademark owners who have either foreign common ownership, parent/subsidiary relationships with foreign companies,10 1 or
United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1985),petitionfor cert.filed, 54 U.S.L.W.
3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411).

92. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1985),petitionfor
cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411). Prior to 1953, the Customs regulations did not deprive protection to U.S. trademark owners because of their
foreign affiliation. Customs did not even require the disclosure of that information.
Atwood, supra note 9, at 307.
93. Appellee's Motion to Vacate at 7, Guerlain, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 915
(1958). Guerlain's ability to invoke § 526, despite its foreign affiliation, demonstrates
that Customs was applying the plain meaning § 526.
94. Appellee's Motion to Vacate at 7, Guerlain, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 915
(1958).
95. See 19 C.F.R. § 11.14 (1959), T.D. 54,932, 94 Treas. Dec. 433-34 (1959) (super-

seded 1972); see Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);

Atwood, supra note 9, at 310. This change in the regulations coincided with Congress'
refusal to enact legislation which would have denied § 526 protection to related companies. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
96. See 19 C.F.R. § 11.14 (1959), T.D. 54,932, 94 Treas. Dec. 433-34 (1959) (super-

seded 1972).

97. See 19 C.F.R § 11.15(a) (1959), T.D. 54,932, 94 Treas. Dec. 433-34 (1959) (su-

perseded 1972). This exception is evident from the information Customs required from

U.S. trademark owners: "disclosure of foreign relationships was not required except for
principal and agent, 19 C.F.R. § 11.15(a) (1959)." See Vivitar Corp. v. United States,
761 F.2d 1552, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1985),petitionfor certfiled, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept.

10, 1985) (No. 85-411). But see Atwood, supra note 9, at 310 (despite the deletion of the
related company exception, Customs privately adhered to the 1953 rules with respect to
those owned by the same person, partnership, association or corporation).
98. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
99. See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1) (1985).
100. See supra notes 91, 95 and accompanying text.

101. See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(2) (1985). In the application to record a registered

trademark, the U.S. trademark owner must disclose:

The identity of any parent or subsidiary company or other foreign company
under common ownership or control which uses the trademark abroad. For
this purpose:
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licensed foreign manufacturers." 2
Customs' inconsistent interpretation is further demonstrated by a recent amicus brief filed jointly by the Customs Service and the Antitrust

Division of the Justice Department,10 3 which urged the court to give section 526 a literal reading" 4 affording statutory protection when the U.S.

trademark owner
is controlled by a foreign manufacturer, despite current
10 5

regulations.
In sum, Customs allowed the importation of genuine goods from 1923
to 1936 and from 1959 to 1972, despite a relationship between the U.S.

trademark owner and the foreign manufacturer, but prohibited importation during the years 1936 to 1953 and from 1972 to the present.
Because the Customs Service has not interpreted section 526 consist-

ently,1 6 its present interpretation carries
little authority, and should be
10 7
given little deference by the courts.
2.

Other Factors Militating Against Deferring to the Customs

Service's Interpretation.
Aside from the consistency of an administrative interpretation, other

factors help determine the degree of deference accorded an agency's in(1) "Common ownership" means individual or aggregate ownership of more
than 50 percent of the business entity; and
(2) "Common control" means effective control in policy and operations and is
not necessarily synonymous with common ownership.
19 C.F.R. § 133.2(d) (1985).
An application to record a trade name must include "[tihe identity of any parent or
subsidiary company, or other foreign company under common ownership or control
which uses the trade name abroad... ." 19 C.F.R. § 133.12(d) (1985).
102. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(3) (1985).
103. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v.
Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
104. See id. at 8-9. The Justice Department and Customs Service argued that § 526
should be coustrued "in accord with the normal meaning of the statutory language," id.
at 9, and further that "neither the legislative reports nor the congressional debate contain
any clear evidence of a legislative intent to deny trademark protection where the owner of
the U.S. mark is owned or controlled by the foreign manufacturer of the trademarked
goods." Id. at 8.
105. Id. at 8-9. The continued uncertainty regarding the regulation's exclusions is further exemplified by the solicitation of data on the grey market problem published in the
Federal Register. Solicitation of Economic Data Notice, 49 Fed. Reg. 21,453 (1984).
For a discussion of the recommendations which are being considered by the WGIP, see
infra Part I.
106. See supra notes 84-105 and accompanying text See Vivitar Corp. v. United
States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1568 2d Cir. 1985, petition for cert.filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S.
Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411). But see El Greco Leather Prod. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc.,
599 F. Supp. 1380, 1400 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding that Customs has consistently interpreted § 526 to limit protection to fact patterns like KatzeO); COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. 844,
852 (D.D.C. 1984) (same), appeal docketed, No. 84-5890 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 1984).
107. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761
F.2d 1552, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1985), petitionfor cert filed, 54 U.S.LW. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10,
1985) (No. 85-411). But see Olympus Corp. v. United States, No. CV-84-0920, slip op. at
30 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1985) (Customs' Service is entitled to "substantial deference"),
appeal docketed, No. 85-6282 (2d Cir. Sept. 27, 1985).
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terpretation of a statute.10 8 One factor is the thoroughness of the
agency's consideration of the matter."° No rationale or official justification has ever been published by the Customs Service to explain its departure from the plain meaning of section 526.110 Under these
circumstances, the thoroughness of Customs' consideration of section
526 should not be presumed.
Another factor is the validity of the reasoning of the interpreting
agency."' Customs relies on its interpretation of the legislative history
of the statute" 2 and its perception of antitrust' and trademark law."1 4
Neither current antitrust nor current trademark principles support Customs' position. Moreover, the Customs Service itself has conceded that
the plain language of section 526 should control its interpretation. 1 5
Further, because Congress has already declined to limit the scope of
protection," 6 courts should reject Customs'
construction of the statute
7
since it is not sanctioned by Congress."
Finally, Congress delegated no legislative authority to Customs 1 8 that
would require giving great deference to Customs' interpretation. Only
when Congress has left a "gap" ' ' 9 to be filled by an administrative inter108. See 1 K. Davis, supra note 81, § 5.03, at 298.
109. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454
U.S. 27, 37 (1981); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
110. Neither the notice of proposed rulemaking, 35 Fed. Reg. 19,269-70 (1970), the
final rules, 37 Fed. Reg. 20,677 (1972), nor the amended rules reflecting the personal use
exception, 44 Fed. Reg. 31,962-68 (1979), explain Customs' position. See Brief for Appellant at 39, Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), petition for
cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10 1985) (No. 85-411).
111. Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S.
27, 37 (1981); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
112. Customs currently maintains that the legislative history of § 526 suggests that
protection should only be afforded to Katzel-type trademark owners. See supra Part I.B.
113. See infra Part II.A and accompanying text.
114. See infra Part II.B and accompanying text.
115. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8-9, Bell & Howell: Mamiya
Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983). See supra note 104.
116. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
117. While considerable deference may be accorded an agency's interpretation of a
statute, such deference is not conferred when "it appears from the statute or its legislative
history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned." Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2783 (1984) (quoting
United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)). The judiciary must reject agency
interpretations made contrary to clearly expressed legislative intent. Id. at 2781-82; see,
eg., Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27
(1981); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978); FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726
(1973); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S.
278 (1965).
118. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1985),petitionfor
cert filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411). For a discussion of the
difference between legislative and interpretative rules, see I K. Davis, supra note 81,

§§ 5.03-.04.
119. "The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created
• . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill
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pretation may regulations be given controlling weight.'t " The Customs

regulations implementing section 526 were promulgated pursuant only to
general authority, not specific legislative authority."' Indeed, Congress
left no gap for Customs to fill.Y'
A thorough analysis of the statute's legislative history, its contempo-

rary judicial assessments and the history of administrative inconsistencies, in light of Customs' lack of authority to implement the exceptions,
mandates using the plain language of the statute to govern its
interpretation.
any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231
(1974).
120. Although Congress may delegate to an administrative agency the power to interpret the extent of protection afforded under a statute, Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416,
425 & n.9 (1977), administrative regulations are only given controlling weight (assuming
they are not "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute," Chevron,
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2782 (1984)) when Congress has expressly left a gap to be filled by administrative interpretation. Id at 2783; see
also Office of Consumers' Council v. FERC, 655 F.2d 1132, 1151-52 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(agency may not preempt legislature or regulate areas it believes are in need of some
federal action); Talley v. Matthews, 550 F.2d 911, 919 (4th Cir. 1977) (agencies should
execute legislative policy; not rewrite acts of Congress for "we must assume that the
framers of these statutory provisions intended to convey the ordinary meaning which is
attached to the language they used.") (quoting Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524,
531 (1947)); Kettell v. Johnson & Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 892, 895 (E.D. Ark. 1972)
(administrative agencies may not substitute their own standards for standards imposed by

statute).
When Congress has implicitly delegated interpretation of a statute to an agency the
agency's interpretation need only be "reasonable" to avoid a judicial determination different from the agency's regulations. Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782 (1984). The Vivitar court upheld the Customs regulations as a
"reasonable exercise of administratively initiated enforcement," Vivitar Corp. v. United
States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178
(U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411) despite the fact that they take away a Congressionally
granted right. However, "it is beyond cavil that a statutory right cannot be taken away
by Administrative fiat." Armendariz v. Hershey, 295 F. Supp. 1351, 1354 (W.D. Tex.),
appeal dismissed, 413 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1969).
Further evidence that Congress did not intend to give Customs legislative authority is
found in the private remedy provision, § 526(c). Congress expressly gave the judiciary
the controlling power to determine rights under § 526. ivitar Corp., 761 F.2d at 1570.
This right to private enforcement, however, is inadequate without less restrictive Customs regulations. See infra Part fl.C.
121. 'The regulations were issued pursuant to general authority under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1624. In contrast, § 1526(d)(2) contains a specific delegation of legislative type authority to the Secretary with respect to importations for personal use and specific authority to
issue regulations in § 1526(d)(4)." Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1569
n.22 (Fed. Cir. 1985), petitionfor cert filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No.
85-411).
122. Id.; cf Helvering v. Credit Alliance Corp., 316 U.S. 107, 113 (1942) (The
Supreme Court, rejecting interpretative rulings promulgated by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, stated that the regulations "attempted to add a supplementary legislative provi.
sion, which could only have been enacted by Congress.").
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II. ANTITRUST AND TRADEMARK CONSIDERATIONS AND THE
SECTION 526(c) PRIVATE REMEDY
The Customs regulations advance long-discarded antitrust and trademark law. Principles of modem antitrust and trademark law support
following the plain meaning of section 526. The regulations also limit
the U.S. trademark owner to the private remedy provided by section
526(c). Section 526(c) is inadequate as a sole remedy because it is ancillary to the broad remedy of exclusion available in section 526(a).
A. Antitrust Considerations

Customs promulgated the current regulations to prevent U.S. trademark owners from violating the antitrust laws by invoking section 526 to
protect their "international enterprises." 123 Even if it were the role of
Customs to implement antitrust policies, a doubtful proposition,124 those
policies should reflect modem, rather than obsolete concerns. In Guerlain, 125 the trial court found that each trademarked product constituted
its own relevant market for purposes of monopolization, and hence found
the defendants in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. 2 6 The
Guerlain decision represents a misinterpretation of United States v. EL.
du Pont de Nemours & Co. 127 where the Supreme Court not only found
that the relevant market in any antitrust claim is based on the reasonable
interchangeability of products, 128 but also rejected the proposition that
123. United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated, 358
U.S. 915 (1958). Customs requires a Katzel fact pattern before protection is afforded
under § 526. Atwood, supra note 9, at 315-16. The current Customs regulations are
"really an attempt to ascertain the degree of common ownership or control of what is
really a single international enterprise," id, at 314, in order to avoid the curtailment of
interbrand competition among U.S. trademark owners in the U.S. market. Id. at 314-17.
124. In dictum, the Osawa court questioned "whether Customs exceeded its authority
in promulgating the regulations." Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1177
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). "[T]he regulations represented an effort on the part of Customs to
implement its perception of antitrust policy. . . .But nothing in the statute suggests that
Congress conferred authority on the Bureau of Customs to condition its benefits on Customs' analysis of antitrust policy." Id.; see also Brief for Olympus Corp. as Amicus Curiae at 19, Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (expressing
doubt of Customs' authority to implement antitrust policy), petition for cert. filed, 54
U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411).
"An interpretive rule may or may not have force of law, depending upon such factors
as. . .the extent to which the subject matter is within special administrative competence
and beyond general judicial competence. . . ." 1 K. Davis, supra note 81, § 5.03, at 300.
A court confronted with an interpretive rather than a legislative rule may "substitute its
judgment for the administrative judgment embodied in an interpretative rule." Id.
§ 5.05, at 315. See supra notes 120-22.
125. United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated, 358
U.S. 915 (1958).
126. Id. at 87.
127. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
128. Id. at 404; see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343 (1962); RSR
Corp. v. FTC, 602 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980);
SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1063 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 439
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one trademark
could convert a single product into the relevant
12 9
market.

The argument that use of section 526 by related companies to divide
international markets violates section 1 of the Sherman Act' 30 should
also be rejected. In Continental T V, Inc, v. G.T.E. Sylvania Inc.,13 1 the
Supreme Court concluded that use of vertical restraints such as territory
or customer restrictions could be procompetitive 1 32 It is now settled
that these types of vertical restrictions are anticompetitive only when
those imposing the restrictions have market power.1 33 The Customs regulations effectively presume market power even though grey marketing
typically exists in the most competitive markets, in which no individual
manufacturer has market power."3 Both the Justice Department and
U.S. 838 (1978); Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894, 917 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423
U.S. 802 (1975).
129. "EIhis power that... automobile or soft drink manufacturers have over their
trademarked products is not the power that makes an illegal monopoly. Illegal power
must be appraised in terms of the competitive market for the product." United States v.
E.I. du Pont & de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956) (footnote omitted).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
131. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
132. The Court overruled United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967), finding procompetitive aspects of vertical restraints which enhance interbrand
competition and prevent free riding. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977). Since that time, "the legality of a vertical restraint in each case
depends on its economic effect, assessed under a 'rule-of-reason' standard." U.S. Dep't of
Justice Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 6264, 6264 (1985) (footnote omitted).
For a discussion of the competitive effects of vertical restraints, see id. at 6266.
133. See Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers Ltd., 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982).
The court found that vertical restraints were not unreasonable restraints of trade because
the defendant had no market power and because the restrictions had a procompetitive
effect. Market power is defined as the "power to raise prices significantly above the competitive level without losing all of one's business." Id. at 745; see U.S. Dep't of Justice
Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 6264, 6268 (1985) (firms with small market
shares employing vertical restraints are not subject to scrutiny by the Antitrust Division);
see also General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Assoc., 744 F.2d 588, 596
(7th Cir. 1984) (under the rule-of-reason standard absent market power restraint on competition is lawful); Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 702
(7th Cir.) (market power is a prerequisite to an unreasonable restraint of trade), cert
denied, 105 S.CL 432 (1984).
Concern about unlawful resale price maintenance is also not addressed adequately at
Customs because there must first be proof of an agreement to set prices and evidence of a
common purpose between the trademark owner and its distributors to constitute such a
finding. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S.CL 1464, 1471 (1984).
But absent evidence of communication between the trademark owner and its
distributors specifically to maintain resale prices at agreed upon levels, the mere
fact that trademark owners are concerned about price-cutting, particularly by
"free riders," and act unilaterally to prevent such activity, does not constitute a
per se unlawful resale price maintenance scheme.
Victor, Preventing Importationof Products in Violation of Property Rights, 53 Antitrust
LJ.783, 802 (1984) (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the inapplicability antitrust
laws for use against trademark owners seeking § 526 protection, see Id. at 800-03.
134. No investigation is made to determine market power. See Osawa & Co. v. B & H
Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Grey marketing ordinarily exists in
markets where there is vigorous interbrand competition, such as perfumes, watches,
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Customs have recently conceded that related companies' use of section
526 to control distribution does not violate the antitrust laws.13 5 Thus,
the antitrust concerns reflected in the current Customs regulations are
outdated and should be discarded.
B.

The Territorialityof Trademarks

The existence of foreign rights under the same trademark, or the corporate affiliation shared between the owner of those rights and the owner
of the U.S. rights, forms no basis for denying protection to the U.S.
trademark owner 1 6 when the U.S. trademark owner has developed the
1 37
goodwill symbolized by the trademark in the U.S. market.
Foreign
affiliation renders the corporation no less American. 3
automobiles and cameras. See S. Liebeler, supra note 4. In each of these markets, no
single manufacturer can raise and control prices in the market because the products are
reasonably interchangeable. Cf. Model Rectifier Corp. v. Takachiho Int'l, Inc., 221
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 502, 504 (9th Cir. 1983) (a natural monopoly held by a trademark
owner over its product violates no antitrust law unless used to control the relevant market); Trixler Brokerage Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., 505 F.2d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 1974)
(same). But see Parfums Stem, Inc. v. United States Customs Serv., 575 F. Supp. 416,
420 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (relying on Guerlain, the court hypothesized that the international
structure of plaintiffs' perfume business would lead to monopolization of the perfume
industry in the domestic market).
Moreover, determinations of antitrust violations are made at Customs based on the
information received from the trademark registrant regarding its foreign corporate affliation. See supra note 101. No attempt is made to define the market or to determine
whether the similarly marked products compete with each other. See Osawa & Co., 589
F. Supp. at 1177. The court in Olympus Corp. v. United States, No. CV-84-0920
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1985), appeal docketed, No. 85-6282 (2d Cir. Sept. 27, 1985), refused
to hold that genuine goods copied or simulated a trademark for purposes of § 42 of the
Lanham Act because such a holding would place Customs "in the position of having to
determine at the time of border crossing whether the domestic trademark holder had
developed an independent public image in this country." Id. at 26. If the Customs Service is not equipped to make determinations of domestic goodwill establishment, they are
not equipped to make determinations of possible antitrust violations.
135. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12-17, Bell & Howell: Mamiya
Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42 (1983). The Justice Department and the Customs
Service recognized that their position at the time of Guerlain was no longer valid and a
literal interpretation of § 526 follows current trademark and antitrust policies. The brief
even listed various procompetitive aspects of vertical restraints. See id. at 12-17.
While it is possible that certain U.S. trademark owners who are part of an international
enterprise could use their trademarks in violation of U.S. antitrust laws, see, eg., Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B.
Carl Zeiss, Jena, 298 F. Supp. 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), af'd,433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971), antitrust laws address these problems. See Osawa &
Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Indeed, it is easier for the
importer to challenge the U.S. trademark owner than for the U.S. trademark owner to
block imports on a case-by-case basis. See infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
136. "An American subsidiary of a foreign company is no less American for being a
foreign company's subsidiary." Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 584 F.
Supp. 1063, 1076 & n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (footnote omitted), vacated on other grounds,
719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983); see Scandinavia Belting Co. v. Asbestos & Rubber Works,
257 F. 937, 962 (2d Cir.) (Ward, J., concurring), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 644 (1919).
137. See infra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
138. See IA W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia on the Law of Private Corporations § 69 (1983)
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It has been held that once a trademark owner has authorized application of the trademark, it has introduced the goods into commerce and
can no longer restrict the sale of those goods.139 This view, however,
assumes that trademarks are universal, rather than territorial. Under the
universality principle, once a trademark is lawfully applied to goods, the
trademark and the goods may be traded anywhere and cannot be deemed
an infringement even if the goods enter another country where another
person owns the exclusive right to the trademark." 4 Although many
early grey market cases,"' and a few modem cases,' 4 2 reflect this "faded

principle," it is a doctrine that fails to recognize the sovereignty of nations and the independent rights which arise thereunder.' 4 3 For these
reasons, territoriality now forms the basis for modem protection of
trademark rights.'"
Territoriality recognizes the separate legal existence of a trademark

("[a] corporation is deemed to be of the state or country which creates it, and with respect to that state or country is a 'domestic corporation' "); cf 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(3), (4)
(1982) (defining "domestic" and "corporation" for the purposes of the Internal Revenue
Code); cf Well Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, No. 84-2157, slip op. at 24, 36 (D.N.J.
Sept. 12, 1985) (percentage of ownership should not determine trademark rights when
separate goodwill is established). See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
139. See COPIAT,598 F. Supp. 844, 850 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal docketed, No. 84-5890
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 1984); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1173
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
140. See Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
Derenberg, TerritorialScope and Situs of Trademarksand Good Will, 47 Va. L Rev. 733,
734 (1961).
Under the universality principle, a U.S. trademark assignee was relegated to suing the
foreign assignor for breach of contract or unfair competition. Third parties not subject to
territorial agreements could lawfully import, provided the trademark on the imported
goods was lawfully applied. Atwood, supra note 9, at 303. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
141. See Hunyadi Janos Corp. v. Stoeger, 285 F. 861, 864 (2d Cir. 1922); Fred Gretsch
Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780, 782 (2d Cir. 1916); Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F.
18, 21 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
142. See COPIAT,598 F. Supp. 844, 850 (D.D.C. 1984), appealdocketed, No. 84-5890
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 1984); see also Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420, 435
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) (the court, by claiming invocation of § 526 conferred an unfair
competitive advantage on U.S. subsidiaries of foreign manufacturers, ignored the principle of territoriality, thereby failing to recognize the separate legal existence of the U.S.
subsidiary's trademark rights), aft'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), petition for cerL
filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411). At least one commentator
makes this error. Power of Trade-MarkOwner, supra note 8, at 567 ("Consumers are not
deceived as to the ultimate source of the commodity whether the American trade-mark
owner is an independent distributor of the foreign producer or a related concern. They
receive the authentic article made by the original manufacturer in both cases.") (footnote

omitted).
143. Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
144. 'The old universality cases and the theory upon which they rest represent an
incorrect analysis that has been repudiated in both statutory and decisional law, at least
where the domestic markholder has developed an independent goodwill." Osawa & Co.
v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see Derenberg, supra note
140, at 734 (a trademark and the associated goodwill "may have a separate legal existence
in different parts of the world"). See generally Osawa & Co., 589 F. Supp. at 1171-74
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under each country's laws, symbolizing the domestic goodwill of the domestic trademark owner.14 This separate legal entity, not the foreign
manufacturer, becomes the "source of origin"14' 6 of the trademarked

goods. 47 By definition, grey market goods come from a source other
than the U.S. trademark owner.1 48 This causes consumers to confuse the
identity1 49
of the company standing behind the goods and assuring their
quality
The concepts of universality and territoriality are inextricably intertwined with the doctrine of exhaustion, which allows the trademark
holder to control only the first sale of its trademarked good in its territory.1 s0 As the first sale is made, the goods enter the stream of commerce
(discussing the principles of universality and territoriality). See infra notes 145-49 and
accompanying text for a discussion of territoriality.
Universality, however, has been replaced by the principle of territoriality. See A.
Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 691-92 (1923); E. Leitz, Inc. v. Watson, 152 F.
Supp. 631, 635-37 (D.D.C. 1957), aff'd, 254 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Roger & Gallet v.
Janmarie, Inc., 245 F.2d 505, 509-10 (C.C.P.A. 1957). "The territoriality of trademark
rights is reflected in several Supreme Court opinions, which ground the doctrine in the
independent sovereignty of nations ...as well as in the view that trademark rights arise
out of use of the mark in a particular geographic market." Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo,
589 F. Supp. 1163, 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citations omitted).
Katzel and A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923) (per curiam) effectively
overruled cases decided on the universality principle. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761
F.2d 1552, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1985), petion for cert filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10,
1985) (No. 85-411); Atwood, supra note 9, at 305.
145. Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); II S.
Ladas, Patents, Trademarks, and Related Rights § 732, at 1340 (1975); Derenberg, supra
note 140, at 734; see Wel Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, No. 84-2157, slip op. at 10
(D.N.J. Sept. 12, 1985) (trademark symbolizes the goodwill of the domestic trademark
owner); cf Premier Dental Prods. Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., No. 85-1780, slip op.
at 11 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 1985) (the title and goodwill of a trademark follows the assignee
of the trademark regardless of limitations thereon required by the assignor).
146. Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063, 1077
(E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983); see Well Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, No. 84-2157, slip op. at 10 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 1985).
147. See Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Criticizing the Guerlain court's failure to recognize the territorial nature of trademark
rights, the Mamiya court stated:
Implicit in this assertion [that § 526 did not apply to international enterprises]
is the assumption that the "source of origin" of a product inevitably must be its
manufacturer. That view is wholly inconsistent with the numerous American
trademark decisions recognizing the exclusive American distributor as the
owner of trademark rights.
Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063, 1077 (E.D.N.Y.
1982), vacated on other grounds, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983). But cf Takamatsu, supra
note 31, at 456 ("[I]t is not against the principle of territoriality to consider foreign events
[such as trademark affixation in a foreign counlry] in construing a domestic trademark

law.").

148. See supra note 4.
149. See supra note 6.
150. Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1173-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
Takamatsu, supra note 31, at 456.
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and the trademark owner's rights are "exhausted." '
It is also argued
that once the goods are sold abroad, the right to control subsequent sales,
even in the United States, has been exhausted."5 2
This doctrine, however, is inapplicable to grey market imports where
the domestic trademark owner has developed its own goodwill independent of the goodwill established by its foreign affliates.'
When local
goodwill is established, only the foreign trademark owner's rights are exhausted by sale to the U.S. trademark owner." Thus, the U.S. trademark owner's rights over its trademark exist until it sells the
trademarked good in the domestic market." Local goodwill is established by the activities engaged in by the trademark owner, such as promoting, advertising, warranting, or generally standing behind its
product. 5 6 That the trademark on merchandise marketed internationally was affixed in a foreign country by a foreign trademark owner is of
no consequence.15 7 Supporters of grey market imports use the fact of
foreign manufacture and trademark affxation to argue that because con-

sumers identify these products by their foreign manufacturers, rather
than their domestic owners, no independent domestic goodwill has been

established.' 5 8 This argument, however, fails to recognize that the do-

mestic trademark owner has established the domestic goodwill and, in-

deed, created the U.S. market for the product. Moreover, trademark
rights are not conditioned on the public's ability to identify the trademark owner. 159
151. Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Takamatsu, supra note 31, at 456.
152. See, eg., COPIAT,598 F. Supp. 844, 850 (D.D.C. 1984), appealdocketed, No. 845890 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 1984); Takamatsu, supra note 31, at 456-57.
153. See Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, No. 84-2157, slip op. at 22 (D.NJ.
Sept. 12, 1985); Premier Dental Prod. Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., No. 85-1780, slip
op. at 10 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 1985); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1174
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); cf. Derenberg, supra note 140, at 749 (offering example of two "entirely
different concerns" which were affiliated at some point in the past "but which long since
have become separate entities").
154. See Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, No. 2157, slip op. at 22 (D.NJ. Sept.
12, 1985); Premier Dental Prods. Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., No. 85-1780, slip op.
at 10 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 1985); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1173-74

(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
155. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
157. See A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 692 (1923); Roger & Galet v.
Janmarie, Inc., 245 F.2d 505, 509-10 (C.C.P.A. 1957); Derenberg, supra note 140, at 736.
158. See Parfums Stem, Inc. v. United States Customs Serv., 575 F. Supp. 416, 419
(S.D. Fla. 1983); cf. United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
("It can hardly be claimed by the defendants in the cases at bar that the trade-marks
indicate an origin with them in the United States, inasmuch as the whole burden of their
advertising is to emphasize French origin."), vacated, 358 U.S. 915 (1958).
159. "[lIt will suffice if the article be known as coming from a single, though anonymous source." Coty, Inc. v. Le Blume Import Co., 292 F. 264, 267-68 (S.D.N.Y.) (citation omitted), aftd, 293 F. 344 (2d Cir. 1923); accord Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v.
Dash, No. 84-2157, slip op. at 27-28 (D.NJ. Sept. 12, 1985); Selchow & Righter Co. v.
Decipher, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 1489, 1496 (E.D. Va. 1984); see Union Carbide Corp. v.
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The Inadequacy of the PrivateRemedy

The Federal Circuit's opinion in Vivitar Corp. v. United States' 60 re-

flects judicial reluctance to change the current total inclusion of grey
market goods in the U.S. market to total exclusion. 161 Vivitar seems to
invite a legislative or administrative change. It acknowledged that
although the present Customs regulations were not controlling, 162 they
were nevertheless a "reasonable exercise of Customs' power."' 63
The Vivitar court found a compromise position in the private remedy
provided by section 526(c). 6 4 The court concluded that individual adju-

dications of U.S. trademark owners' rights under section 526 adequately
protected the trademark owner.' 65 The court believed that section 526(c)

would be superfluous
if Customs was required to exclude unauthorized
166
imports sua sponte.
Restricting the trademark owner to a private action against the im-

porter is inadequate for two reasons. First, the identities of importers are
often difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain. 167 Second, even if the im-

porters are identifed, the remedy requires U.S. trademark owners to

bring an endless series of lawsuits.' 68 Once a judicial determination is
Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 380 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); Osawa
& Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
160. 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S.
Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411).
161. See Riley, supra note 11, at 22 ("[the Vivitar Court] ruled that Customs was probably wrong, but held that trademark owners should bring private court actions to enforce
their rights rather than compelling Customs to enforce them at the borders.").
162. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1985), petition
for cert filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411).
163. Id. at 1555.
164. See id. at 1570. See supra note 17 for the text of § 526(c).
165. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1569-71 (2d Cir. 1985),petition
for cert.filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411). The court concluded
that the regulations were no more than a definition of Customs' role in its administration
of the statute. See id. at 1569.
166. Id.
167. The closely guarded secrecy of the identities of grey market importers is exemplified in Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), where the
defendants chose sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 rather than identify
the sources of their grey market products. See id at 1166 n.2, 1170.
In another case, certain importers whose goods were detained by Customs pursuant to
a temporary restraining order requested anonymity because of alleged trade secrets. This
request was denied for insufficient showing of a trade secret. See Parfums Stem, Inc. v.
United States Customs Serv., 575 F. Supp. 416, 418 (S.D. Fla. 1983); cf.Model Rectifier
Corp. v. Takachiho Int'l Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 502, 503 (9th Cir. 1983) ("the appellants. . . unsuccessfully attempted to locate and cut off [the diverter's] foreign source").
168. The Vivitar court failed to spell out whether one court order in favor of the U.S.
trademark owner would require Customs to exclude all grey market products from all
sources or only exclude those from the named defendants. See Appellant's Petition for
Rehearing and for Clarification at 9, Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed.
Cir. 1985). Customs interpretation of the Vivitar opinion remains to be seen. Regardless
of the way this opinion is implemented, the burden of identifying the importer will remain inequitably on the U.S. trademark owner.
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made in the district court that the goods of a particular importer must be
barred, only the named defendants are prevented from importing the
goods. These named defendants can merely divert their goods to another
anonymous entity, who could import the goods until the U.S. trademark
owner identifies the new source and obtains an exclusion order in a second lawsuit. This burdensome and inadequate procedure fails to protect
the section 526 right.
Because individual judicial determinations are not adequate 169 as the
sole remedy, a better interpretation of section 526(c) allows the U.S.
trademark owner to collect damages from the diverter when Customs
mistakenly allows importation of the goods' 7 0 or when the unauthorized
goods find
their way into the U.S. market despite the efforts of
17 1
Customs.

III.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE GREY MAPKET PROBLEM

The Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade's Working Group on
Intellectual Property (WGIP) devised six proposals from which it will
recommend one in order to end the controversy within the Administration over grey market goods. 7 2 These options cover the complete range
of possible responses to the grey market problem and are therefore worthy of study. An analysis of these options reveals
that only one can ade73
quately protect the U.S. trademark owner.'
The first option is to maintain the status quo.' 7 This option is not
justified by the plain meaning of the statute,17 - is based on discredited
antitrust 7 6 and trademark principles,1 77 benefits anonymous grey market
importers17 at the expense of U.S. trademark owners, and leaves the
trademark owner with an inadequate private remedy under section
79
526(c).'
The second option would require labeling the grey market goods to
inform consumers that the goods they purchase are "neither authorized
nor warranted by the U.S. trademark holder."'
Although this require169. See supra notes 167-68.
170. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing and for Clarification at 6, Vivitar Corp. v.
United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
171. Id.
172. See Inside U.S. Trade, supra note 18, at 10. Thus far the group has been unable to
overcome inter-agency conflicts to reach a solution to recommend to the White HouseSee Inside the Administration 35, August 29, 1985, at 1, 5.
173. See infra Conclusion for the proposed option.
174. See Inside U.S. Trade, supra note 18, at 10.
175. See supra Parts L.A & I.B.
176. See supra Part II.A.
177. See supra Part ll.B.
178. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
179. See supra Part ll.C.
180. Inside U.S. Trade, supra note 18, at 10. Similar legislation has been passed by the
State of New York, whose law requires that the product be labeled or that a sign be

placed at the point of sale stating that the product is not warranted by the U.S. trademark
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ment may alert consumers to the grey market problem and thus decrease
consumer confusion,1 8 ' it nevertheless may cause degradation of the
trademark's
goodwill in the U.S. market if the product proves
18 2
defective.

Further, the labeling requirement does not prevent free riding on the
U.S. trademark owner's goodwill.' 83 Free riding may be complicated
when a U.S. trademark owner offers promotional incentives such as rebates.'8 4 Although purchasers of a grey market product may be alerted
to its lack of warranty, if they are motivated to purchase the product
because of the U.S. trademark owner's promotional campaign, 185 they
may be unaware that they are not entitled to a rebate. Consequently, the
owner. Failure to so label is punishable by a fine and allows the purchaser to receive a
credit or refund provided the product was not used or damaged. Act of July 24, 1985, ch.
496 (to be codified at N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 218-aa). This law is limited to those products normally accompanied by a warranty. See id. It also provides for an affirmative
defense if the consumer is provided with a written warranty offering the same or greater
protection than the manufacturer's warranty. See id. The flaw in this affirmative defense
is that it is often the U.S. trademark owner, not the manufacturer, who warrants the
products. When the manufacturer provides no warranty protection, any protection given
by the grey market retailer will provide an affirmative defense under the law.
Moreover, enforcement of this type of legislation is too subjective. The warranty provided by the grey market retailer may be equal or better protection on its face, but warranty protection is only as good as the quality of service provided under it. The goodwill
of the trademark is impaired when purchasers are dissatisfied with poor warranty service.
There is also difficulty in assessing what is equal or better warranty protection when
many trademark owners exclude certain features from the warranty. Grey market retailers may include some features in their own warranty but exclude an item which the U.S.
trademark owner honors when warranting an authorized import. "Disparities between
plaintiff's and defendants' performance of warranty work would further confuse the market place as to the standing and meaning of [plaintiff's] mark." Osawa & Co. v. B & H
Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Most importantly, the U.S. trademark owner has no assurance that the grey market
retailer "has the incentive to uphold the reputation of the mark" by "graciously" and
"properly" performing warranty service. Id.; see Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash,
No. 84-2157, slip op. at 32 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 1985).
181. See supra note 6. Assuming the label is conspicuous, unambiguous and is written
to educate the consumer to the ramifications of his or her purchase, consumers will be
alerted to the existence of authorized and unauthorized identically trademarked goods.
However, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that labeling products to indicate
different sources would prevent consumer confusion. See A. Bouijois & Co. v. Katzel,
260 U.S. 689, 691 (1923) (Court rejected defendant's argument that display of its name,
Wertheimer, instead of Bourjois, prevented confusion); Vivitar Corp. v. United States,
761 F.2d 1552, 1564 n.17 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (same), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W.
3178 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-411).
182. Some courts addressing this issue have found that the grey market products were
of different quality, justifying exclusion. See, ag., Model Rectifier Corp. v. Takachiho
Int'l, Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 502, 503 (9th Cir. 1983); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo,
589 F. Supp. 1163, 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
183. See supra note 9.
184. Some U.S. trademark owners have resorted to offering promotional rebates to
purchasers as an attempt to differentiate authorized from unauthorized imports. See
Jervey, 'Grey market' hits camera, watch sales, Advertising Age, Aug. 15, 1983, at 62.
185. The purchaser may be deceived by the retailer that a rebate or U.S. warranty card
is in the box with the product, when it is actually a grey market import containing neither
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goodwill of the U.S. trademark owner is impaired. Moreover, under this
regulations remain intact. Those regulations
option the present 8Customs
6
are inappropriate.1

The third option is to amend section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930l to
provide that after a showing of trademark infringement, the U.S. trademark owner would have to prove only substantial injury to itself rather
than substantial injury to the industry in which it participates in order to
obtain an exclusion order under section 337.188
Since courts are divided on whether the sale of genuine grey market

goods constitutes trademark infringement,

89 this

proposal begs the ques-

tion. Again, the proposal would leave the present regulations intact. In

essence, this remedy leaves the U.S. trademark owner in the position of

relying on the inadequate private remedy of section 526(c).19°

a rebate offer nor a U.S. warranty card. See Barsky, 47th Street Photo Leads in Complaints, City Bus., May 6-17, 1985, at 1, 15; Collado Associates, supra note 6, at 64-65.
186. See supra Parts I & IL.
187. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
188. See Inside U.S. Trade, supra note 18, at 10. Section 337 provides:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles
into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or
agent of either, the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially
injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United States,
or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States, are declared unlawful. ...
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982).
As an example of the operation of the statute, the Duracell Corporation, finding itself
in competition with batteries manufactured by its foreign subsidiaries and trademarked
under foreign law, invoked protection under § 337 on behalf of the alkaline battery industry. The Administrative Law Judge found that although "no violation of Section 337
could be predicated on the ban on trademarked imports contained in Section 526 ....
[because] Section 526 was not intended to apply against imports bearing trademarks legitimately affixed by foreign companies related to the United States trademark owner,"
Victor, supra note 133, at 798; see In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, No. 337-TA-165,
USITC Pub. No. 1616, at 21 (Int'l Trade Comm. 1984) (affirming the Administrative
Law Judge's finding), § 337 could be invoked when the imports fall within those proscribed by § 42 of the Lanham Act. See In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, Inv. No. 337TA-165 (USITC Aug. 10, 1984), reportedat [July-Dec.] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at
239 (Aug. 29, 1984). This decision was affirmed by the International Trade Commission.
See In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, No. 337-TA-165, USITC Pub. No. 1616 (Int'l Trade
Comm. 1984). However, pursuant to § 337(g), the ITC submitted its determination to
President Reagan who rejected the ITC's position. In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, Inv.
No. 337-TA-165 (Jan. 28, 1985), reportedat [Jan.-June] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at
171 (Jan. 30, 1985). Reasons for the rejection included the President's support of
§ 133.21 of the Customs regulations, thereby preventing related companies from invoking
§ 337 as welL See id.
189. Compare El Greco Leather Prod. Co. v. Shoe World Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1380,
1394 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding the importation and sale of genuine goods does not constitue trademark infringement) and Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l (Am.) Corp.,
707 F.2d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 1983) (same) with In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, No.
337-TA-165; USITC Pub. No. 1616 (Intl Trade Comm. 1984) (finding the importation
and sale of genuine goods constitutes trademark infringement) and Osawa & Co. v. B &
H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (same).
190. See supra note 17 for text of statute and supra Part ILC for discussion.
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The fourth option would allow related companies to exclude the imports after a Customs determination that the imports were not identical
to the authorized goods.19 1 This option's failure is obvious. It would
create a tremendous enforcement burden on Customs and the judiciary.192 Moreover, the burden of proof would rest with the U.S. trademark owner to show the import's non-identity. 93 Further, this proposal
encourages free riding. 94 The proposal invites litigation in which determinations of trademark infringement or unfair competition
are made on
the basis of minute differences in the product. Finally, the proposal preserves the unjustified distinction between related and non-related
companies.
The fifth option would allow importation only if the trademark is removed or obliterated. 195 Although this option provides some protection
to the U.S. trademark owner and to goodwill, 196 other problems still exist. First, the goal of this option is to destroy the grey market. This
market destruction occurs because many grey market goods are expensive items and consumers would hesitate to purchase a generic brandthey should be entitled to know who manufactured the product. It is
therefore likely that many grey market retailers will not find enough purchasers to support their grey market practices.1 97 Moreover, some trademarks cannot be removed without destroying or seriously impairing the
191. See Inside U.S. Trade, supra note 18, at 10. Under this option, "identity" would
be determined based, inter alia, on shape, taste, color, freshness, composition, trade dress,
function, durability, similarity of warranty and availability of repair services. Id.
192. Determinations of product identity based on a myriad of factors, see id., create an
administrative monster. As § 526 is presently interpreted, it is "a completely futile, if not
impossible task" for Customs to make determinations of international business relationships. Atwood, supra note 9, at 311. A change from determinations of business relationships to also include determinations of identity would make Customs' job even more
burdensome.
193. Cf Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(setting forth the requirements for a preliminary injunction); In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, No. 337-TA-165, USITC Pub. No. 1616, at 26-37 (Int'l Trade Comm. 1984) (discussing Duracell's proof and the requirements of likelihood of confusion,
misappropriation of trade dress, false designation of origin, and violations of the Fair
Packaging and Labeling Act amounting to substantial injury to the alkaline battery industry under § 337). This is an unfair burden for asserting a statutory right under § 526.
Cf. Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (equity
dictates that the burden of informing the consumer that a product has not been authorized for sale and is not warranted by the U.S. trademark owner should be on the
diverter).
194. By allowing the diverter to import and sell what Customs has determined to be an
identical product, the proposal implicitly acknowledges and accepts that sale of these
imports is facilitated by the free ride the diverters have on the U.S. trademark owners'
promotion, advertisement and service of the manufacturer's product. See supra note 9.
195. See Inside U.S. Trade, supra note 18, at 10.
196. See E. Ludwig, Outline for Talk to D.C. BarAssociation on Grey Market Issue 6
(May 22, 1985) (available in the files of Fordham Law Review).
197. Cf El Greco Leather Prod. Co. v. Shoe World Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1380, 1384
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (discussing the difficulty that diverters sometimes encounter when seeking a market for their goods).
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product. Ultimately, the plain meaning of the statute would govern. If
the Administration wishes to enforce the statute, it should do so by direct, rather than indirect methods.1 9
Assuming the grey market retailers could find a market, avenues for
free riding are still available.1 99 Further, obliterating the trademark itself
does not change the brand recognition of products that consumers make
based on shape, size or construction.'
The result would be to convert
section 526 actions into actions for unfair competition L0and trademark
infringement based on trade dress 2 or increase counterfeiting.
CONCLUSION

The last option is to create a new administrative policy prohibiting
grey market goods bearing registered U.S. trademarks unless written
consent is provided by the U.S. trademark owner." 3 This is the position
advocated by this Note.
This proposal reflects the literal meaning of the plain language of section 526 by protecting all U.S. trademark owners regardless of their foreign affiliation.'
Excluding grey market goods is consistent with
current antitrust law because it gives American companies with foreign
affiliation the power to exercise the same control over the vertical distribution of their
products that their counterparts with domestic manufac2 °s
turers enjoy.
The proposal is consistent with modem trademark law because it recognizes the existence of territorial rights and the rights established by the
U.S. trademark owner's investment in goodwill.' 6 It alleviates consumer confusion and the resulting denigration of goodwill established by
the U.S. trademark owner.2 "7 Finally, the proposal respects goodwill by
eliminating parasitic free riding.?"
Maureen Beyers
[As this issue was going to press, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Vivitar Corp. v. United States.*]
198. See infra Conclusion for a discussion of a direct method to enforce the statute.
199. See supra note 9. The retailers of grey market products could sell their "generic"
products by advertising that their product is made by the same people as the U.S. trademark owner's product: a small variation of the free riding theme. See S. Liebeler, supra
note 4; E. Ludwig, supra note 196, at 6.
200. E. Ludwig, supra note 196, at 6.
201. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
202. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982).
203. See Inside U.S. Trade, supra note 18, at 10.
204. See supra Part I.B.
205. See supra Part ll.A.
206. See supra note 5 and Part II.B.
207. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
* 54 U.S.L.W. 3460 (U.S. Jan, 14, 1986), denying cert. to 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir.

1985).

